IDENTITY, HISTORICAL MEMORY, AND POLITICAL POLARISATION IN EURASIA: WHY LEGAL PRECISION MATTERS
Updated: Oct 13
Introduction
The increasingly fragmented security environment across the Black Sea, the South Caucasus, and wider Eurasia has renewed attention to the political use of historical memory, identity, and collective grievance. In periods of strategic uncertainty, political actors often seek to strengthen legitimacy by presenting ethnic, religious, linguistic, or historical identities as sources of permanent political division. This tendency is particularly consequential where unresolved conflicts, displacement, diaspora mobilisation, and external geopolitical competition intersect.
The question is therefore not whether identity should have a place in public life. In plural societies, identity is an unavoidable and legitimate element of representation. The more serious question is whether identity is articulated within a framework of equal citizenship, law, and dialogue, or whether it is mobilised as an instrument of exclusion, hostility, and geopolitical rivalry
These debates are not, in themselves, abnormal. In plural societies, collective identities provide individuals and communities with forms of meaning, continuity, representation, and social solidarity. Problems arise, however, when political actors transform identity into an exclusive criterion of legitimacy, portray historical memory as immune from scholarly inquiry, or present the rights and security of one group as necessarily incompatible with those of another.
The principal challenge is therefore not “identity politics” in the abstract. The more serious problem is the political instrumentalization of identity: the use of ethnic, religious, linguistic, diasporic, or historical claims to deepen social divisions, delegitimize political opponents, obscure institutional failures, or justify discrimination. Such processes can be reinforced by disinformation, selective remembrance, inflammatory language, and the improper use of legal or historical concepts.
This commentary argues that durable social cohesion in Eurasia requires a framework that combines three elements: respect for equal citizenship and minority rights; legal precision in addressing discrimination and incitement; and a historically responsible approach to collective memory. The objective should not be to suppress identity, nor to impose a single official memory, but to prevent identity-based claims from being converted into instruments of exclusion, hostility, or political manipulation.
The evolving security environment in the Black Sea–South Caucasus space has once again demonstrated that regional competition is conducted not only through diplomacy, military capability, and economic connectivity, but also through narratives of identity, historical memory, and collective grievance.
Identity Claims, Representation, and Exclusionary Mobilisation
Identity should not be treated as inherently incompatible with democratic politics. Cultural, religious, linguistic, and historical affiliations are ordinary components of social life, and communities may legitimately seek recognition, representation, and equal access to public institutions. The protection of such rights can strengthen the relationship between citizens and the state, particularly where communities perceive that their concerns have been ignored or misrepresented.
The problem begins when identity is transformed from a basis for participation into an exclusive claim to political legitimacy. Exclusionary mobilisation presents one ethnic, religious, historical, or cultural community as the sole authentic owner of the state, public space, or national memory. It reduces political disagreement to collective disloyalty and portrays minorities, migrants, dissenting citizens, or external actors as permanent threats. In this form, identity ceases to be a means of representation and becomes a tool of political polarisation
The difficulty begins when identity is separated from equal citizenship and the rule of law. Political rhetoric may then reduce complex social and historical questions to a simplified opposition between “us” and “them.” In this setting, economic grievances, security concerns, historical trauma, and electoral competition can be absorbed into a language of collective threat. The result is not greater representation, but greater polarisation.
This distinction is particularly important in Eurasia, where state borders, migration patterns, imperial legacies, post-imperial transformations, conflicts, diaspora communities, and competing historical narratives have created layered and overlapping identities. The region cannot be analyzed as a single political space. Yet many of its societies confront comparable pressures: the securitization of identity, the politicization of memory, the spread of online hostility, and the instrumental use of minority issues in domestic and international competition.
It may be argued that states facing acute security threats require a strong and unified national narrative in order to preserve cohesion. This concern should not be dismissed, particularly in societies affected by war, terrorism, displacement, or external pressure. Yet national cohesion built upon the marginalisation of alternative memories or the stigmatisation of particular communities is inherently fragile. A more durable form of cohesion rests on equal citizenship, constitutional loyalty, institutional fairness, and the capacity to discuss difficult historical questions without converting disagreement into hostility
Historical Memory, Legal Categories, and Conceptual Discipline
Historical memory is indispensable to public life. Communities have legitimate reasons to commemorate war, persecution, displacement, forced migration, and other forms of collective suffering. The recognition of suffering, however, must not be confused with the uncritical political use of historical terminology. Legal concepts such as genocide, crimes against humanity, racial discrimination, and incitement to hatred carry specific legal and evidentiary meanings. They should not be reduced to general terms of political condemnation.
This distinction does not diminish the moral seriousness of historical suffering. On the contrary, it protects the integrity of legal concepts and prevents their selective instrumentalisation. When grave legal terms are used without regard to evidence, applicable law, judicial findings, or historical context, public debate becomes more polarised and the victims of genuine atrocity may be drawn into contemporary political competition.
The distinction between legitimate commemoration, historical inquiry, political assertion, and legal qualification is particularly important in regions marked by conflict, displacement, and competing narratives of victimhood. It requires public officials, researchers, media institutions, and civil-society actors to approach contested historical questions with evidentiary discipline and conceptual consistency. It also requires states to protect legitimate expression and minority participation while responding lawfully to advocacy that crosses the threshold into discrimination, hostility, or violence.
The legal and institutional framework
International human-rights law provides a useful starting point because it links the protection of individual and minority rights with clear limits on incitement to hatred.
Article 27 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights provides that persons belonging to ethnic, religious, or linguistic minorities must not be denied the right, together with other members of their group, to enjoy their culture, practice their religion, or use their language. This provision affirms that cultural and religious diversity is compatible with the political unity of the state.[1]
At the same time, Article 20(2) of the Covenant requires states to prohibit advocacy of national, racial, or religious hatred that constitutes incitement to discrimination, hostility, or violence. This is a high threshold. It does not permit governments to suppress legitimate criticism, historical inquiry, peaceful political advocacy, or minority representation merely because such expression is inconvenient or controversial. Rather, it addresses advocacy that crosses into incitement and places individuals or groups at risk of discrimination, hostility, or violence.[ohchr][ohchr]
The distinction is important. A state that disregards minority participation risks deepening alienation and distrust. A state that invokes “social cohesion” to silence lawful criticism may create further resentment and weaken democratic legitimacy. Conversely, a state that tolerates systematic incitement or dehumanizing rhetoric in the name of political expediency risks normalizing hostility and undermining equal citizenship.
The OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities has similarly emphasized that effective participation by national minorities in public life is an essential component of a peaceful and democratic society. The Lund Recommendations identify practical mechanisms including representation, consultative structures, participation at central, regional, and local levels, legal safeguards, and accessible remedies.[2]
These principles should not be understood as external templates to be applied mechanically. Institutional solutions must reflect each country’s constitutional system, demographic composition, historical experience, and political circumstances. Nevertheless, the underlying principle remains broadly applicable: exclusion produces vulnerability, while meaningful participation can strengthen social trust and state resilience.
Two Eurasian Contexts: Memory, Participation, and Political Stability
Case | Analytical purpose | What to examine |
South Caucasus | Historical memory, displacement, conflict narratives, external influence | How trauma, territorial narratives, commemoration, diaspora politics, and post-conflict discourse affect reconciliation and regional cooperation |
One selected Central Asian or Balkan case | Minority participation, local institutions, language, representation, or online polarisation | Whether meaningful participation and fair local governance reduce the appeal of exclusionary identity narratives |
The Eurasian setting contains distinct conflicts and political systems; sweeping generalizations should therefore be avoided. Still, several recurring patterns merit attention.
First, political leaders and movements may use identity narratives to convert ordinary political competition into an existential struggle. Electoral rivalry, regional inequality, or dissatisfaction with public services can be reframed as evidence of ethnic betrayal, religious threat, cultural decline, or foreign subversion. Such narratives may create short-term political cohesion, but they often weaken the institutions needed to manage pluralism peacefully.
Second, online communication has made identity-based polarisation easier to amplify. Digital platforms can rapidly circulate emotionally charged material, decontextualized historical images, misleading demographic claims, and conspiratorial narratives. Content that portrays entire communities as collectively disloyal, violent, or culturally incompatible can create an atmosphere in which discrimination becomes more socially acceptable. The speed of dissemination also makes correction difficult, especially where independent media, fact-checking institutions, or trusted local interlocutors are weak.
Third, historical memory can become intertwined with contemporary geopolitical competition. Diaspora mobilization, international lobbying, external media ecosystems, and cross-border kin-state narratives can make domestic identity questions part of wider strategic disputes. This does not mean that diaspora engagement or transnational solidarity is inherently harmful. It means that public authorities, civil society, and researchers should distinguish carefully between legitimate civic advocacy and the deliberate externalization of domestic divisions.
Fourth, socioeconomic disparities can be interpreted through identity when communities experience unequal access to employment, education, public investment, or state institutions. Economic policy alone cannot resolve political polarisation, but persistent inequalities can make exclusionary narratives more persuasive. Policies designed to promote regional development, equal public services, fair employment opportunities, and transparent local governance can therefore have an important preventive function.
From polarisation to constructive resilience
A viable response must avoid two errors. The first is to treat all expressions of group identity as dangerous. Such an approach can stigmatize minority communities and invite disproportionate restrictions on legitimate rights. The second is to romanticize identity claims and ignore the possibility that they may be instrumentalized for exclusionary or violent purposes.
The more balanced approach is to strengthen democratic resilience through legal consistency, institutional inclusion, and responsible public discourse.
Governments should ensure that constitutional and legal protections apply equally to all citizens and communities. Participation should be meaningful rather than symbolic. Where appropriate, advisory bodies, local consultation mechanisms, and transparent channels of communication can help authorities identify grievances before they become sources of wider conflict. The OSCE’s Lund Recommendations specifically identify consultative institutions and effective participation as useful safeguards for democratic stability.[hcnm.osce][osce]
Public institutions should also apply anti-discrimination and anti-incitement standards consistently. Selective enforcement—whether against minorities, political opponents, or particular ideological groups—damages the credibility of the law. Legal responses to hate speech must remain compatible with freedom of expression, while giving due weight to intent, context, reach, likelihood of harm, and the vulnerability of targeted communities.
Educational and cultural institutions have a parallel responsibility. Historical education should neither impose collective guilt nor erase difficult episodes from public consciousness. It should encourage critical inquiry, familiarity with primary sources, awareness of multiple experiences, and a clear distinction between historical scholarship and political propaganda. A society able to discuss painful history without dehumanizing present-day communities is better equipped to resist polarisation.
Finally, regional and international actors should avoid applying human-rights language selectively. Principles such as non-discrimination, minority protection, opposition to racism, and prevention of incitement lose authority when they are treated primarily as instruments of geopolitical pressure. Consistent standards do not require identical political judgments in every setting; they do require honesty about evidence, legal terminology, and the rights of all affected persons.
Constructive Eurasianism and Cooperative Regional Order
The need for conceptual discipline and inclusive political institutions also has a regional dimension. In this respect, the framework of Constructive Eurasianism offers a useful point of departure. Constructive Eurasianism should not be understood as an anti-Western political alternative, nor as a call for a new ideological bloc. Rather, it emphasises Türkiye’s capacity to maintain its institutional relations with the West while developing cooperative, balanced, and non-hegemonic relations across Eurasia.[3]
Such an approach is relevant to identity-based polarisation because external rivalry often encourages political actors to treat local historical and cultural disputes as instruments of wider geopolitical competition. A constructive regional order requires the opposite approach: regional ownership, respect for international law, avoidance of zero-sum blocs, and practical cooperation in areas where common interests exist, including security, trade, connectivity, migration management, countering disinformation, and the prevention of hate-based violence.[4]
Türkiye’s historical, geographical, and institutional position gives it a particular interest in preventing the Black Sea, the South Caucasus, and adjacent regions from becoming permanent arenas of competitive identity politics. A policy grounded in legal consistency, constructive dialogue, and regional equilibrium is therefore not merely an ethical preference; it is also a strategic necessity. AVİM’s Constructive Eurasianism framework has similarly presented regional cooperation, strategic autonomy, and avoidance of hegemonic rivalry as central considerations for Türkiye’s Eurasian policy.[5]
Policy implications
For Eurasian states and regional stakeholders, five practical priorities deserve emphasis:
For national governments. Governments should strengthen equal citizenship through consistent anti-discrimination enforcement, accessible judicial remedies, transparent local administration, and meaningful channels for participation. They should avoid treating linguistic, religious, cultural, or historical difference as evidence of political disloyalty.
For media, researchers, and civil society. Legislatures and courts should apply legal concepts such as racial discrimination, hate speech, incitement, genocide, and crimes against humanity with strict conceptual discipline. Legal language should not become a substitute for historical inquiry or political debate. At the same time, institutions must act decisively when expression reaches the threshold of incitement to discrimination, hostility, or violence.
For regional actors and Türkiye. Regional actors, including Türkiye, should support dialogue mechanisms that reduce the geopolitical exploitation of historical grievances. Priority should be given to legally grounded diplomacy, cross-border academic exchange, responsible historical research, and cooperative initiatives addressing disinformation, hate speech, displacement, and community-level trust.
Conclusion
Eurasia’s diversity should not be treated as an inherent threat to stability. The more serious danger arises when historical memory, ethnicity, religion, language, and cultural belonging are transformed into exclusive political claims and incorporated into wider geopolitical rivalries. Such mobilisation weakens equal citizenship, distorts legal concepts, and makes cooperative regional security more difficult.
The appropriate response is neither the suppression of identity nor the uncritical celebration of every identity-based claim. It is the establishment of a political and legal framework in which communities can participate meaningfully in public life, historical questions can be examined through evidence and scholarly inquiry, and incitement to hatred can be addressed without suppressing lawful expression.
For Türkiye and other Eurasian stakeholders, this task is directly connected to the wider objective of preserving regional equilibrium. A constructive regional order requires legal consistency, conceptual discipline, plural historical understanding, and resistance to efforts that turn local grievances into permanent geopolitical fault lines. In this sense, cooperative security and inclusive citizenship should be understood as mutually reinforcing components of long-term regional stability
[1] https://www.ohchr.org/en/instruments-mechanisms/instruments/international-covenant-civil-and-political-rights
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